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FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP IN 
INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
Ingeborg Schwenzer* 
This article takes an analytical !ook ofthe concepts offorce majeure and hardship when attempting 
to extract oneselffrom an agreement. The article starts offwith a briefswnmmy oftheir historical 
background and their presence in various domestic legal systems, such as France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. lt goes on to examine the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CJSG) 
which does not have force majeure and hardship provisions but does have a provision that has the 
same ejfect. T71e article goes on to describe the requirements for avoiding liability in international 
sales contracts and concludes with the consequences offorce majeure and hardship. 
lt is a great honour to be invited to contribute to this tribute issue for Tony Angela. T ony has 
always been a wandcrer between countries and contincnts fructifying legal thinking across borders. 
1b.is small paper cannot even pretend to have such importance. lt will simply discuss some current 
questions that we face in international sales law. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Unforesecable changed circumstances are probably one of the major problems parties -
especially those who are party to a long or langer 1erm complex contract - may face in international 
trade. Indeed, with globalisation these problems are increased as the involvement of more and more 
countries in production and procurement entails even greater imponderables. Natural disasters or 
changes of political and economic factors may considerably affect the very basis of the bargain. 
There may be an earthquake, a flood or a civil war in one of the production countries, forcing the 
producer 1o resort to countries with much higher production costs; import or export bans may hinder 
the envisaged flow of goods; or price fluctuations tliat were not foreseeable at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract make the performance by the seller unduly burdensome or devaluate the 
con1ract performance for the buyer. 
Tue paradigm of pacta sunt servanda or sanctity of contract simply places the burden of such a 
change of circumstances upon the party on which jt falls. However, since the old Roman days the 
Dr iur (Freiburg i Br), LLM (UC Berkeley), Professor of Private Law at the University of Basel, 
Switzerland. 1 am deeply indebted to my research assistant, lic iur Alain F Hosang, for editing the footnotes. 
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principle of impossibilium nul!a est obligatio, or there is no obligation to perform impossible 
things, 1 has been recogniscd. Things were simple at that time: the slave or the cattle that had been 
sold bad perished; or perhaps the crop that should be delivered was destroyed. Furthennore, under 
the doctrine of rebus sie stantibus2 developed by the Roman praetor, 3 an unforeseeable and 
extmordinary change of circumstances rendering a contractual obligation extremely burdensome 
could be recognised. Since these days, impossibility ,force majeure or the like have become grounds 
for exemption in every legal system. 4 However, the question whether simple changes in the 
surrounding economic conditions may exempt the debtor from liability under thc contract has 
always been a hotly debated issue. 5 lt is to this very day. Let me first start with a short overview of 
how some domestic legal zystems treat this qucstion. 
II SOME DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS 
Tue position ofFrcnch law represents one extreme and it is well documented. \Vhereas the rule 
forforce majeure is laid down in Article 1148 ofthe Code Civil (CC), neither general civil \aw nor 
commercial law has been favourable to the concept of hardship. 6 Tue famous theory of 
imprivision7 that allows a contract tobe modified in case of a change of circumstances has been 
applied to administrative contracts only.8 However, the Cour de Cassation has apparently moved 
Dig 50.17.185. 
2 The term rebus sie stantibus was mentioned for the first time in the early 16th century In 1507, Jason de 
Mayno (1435-1519) suggested the use ofthe rebus sie stantibus doctrine as a general principle in contract 
law. For further details on this matter see Ralf Köbler Die "clausula rebus sie stantibus" als allgemeiner 
Rechtsgrwuisatz (JCB Mohr, Tübingen, 1991) 30-31. 
The idea of adapting agreements and promises to an unforesecable and extraordinary change has its roots in 
roman philosophy with Cicero and Seneca. The doctrine found its way into the Canon law in the 14'h 
century, referring to it as rebus sie se habentibus. For further details see Köbler, above n 2, 28. 
See Germany: Bügerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 313 (Störung der Geschaftsgrundlage); Italy: Codice 
Civile (CC), Arts 1467-1469 (eecessiva onerositit sopravvenuta); France: Code Civil (CC), Art 1148 (force 
majeure). See also Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (3ed, .TCB Mohr, 
Tübingen, 1996) 533 
See Zweigert and Kötz, above n 4, 534-535. Tbe actual trigger for this discussion was tbe cnormous rise in 
prices due to World War I (1914-1918). 
6 See Catherine Kessedjian "Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship" (2005) 25 Int'l Rev L & 
Econ 415,427. 
For details, see Phillippe Stoffel-Munck Regards sur la thtiorie de l'imprbision: vers une souplesse 
contractuel!e en droit privi .franr;ais contemporain (Presses universitaires d'Aix-11arseille, Aix-en-
Provence, 1994). 
See Conseil d'Etat, 30 Mar 1916, DP1916, 325; Piet Abas Rebus sie stantibus (Karl Heymanns, Cologne, 
1993) 43. 
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away slightly from the strict pacta sunt servanda principle; it appears tobe heading in the direction 
of cventually recognising some kind of hardship.9 
Many continental legaj_ systems, however, accept the theory ofhardship, among them Gennany, 
1be Netherlands, ltaly, Greece, Portugal, Austria as well as the Scandinavian countrics. 10 The most 
recent aclrnowledgemcnt by statute can be folUJd in Germany. The Statute on the Modemisation of 
the Law of Obligations in 2001 finally codified the right to have the contract adapted to the changed 
circumstances in section 313 ofthe Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 11 
English law seems to reject any notion of rclief for changed circumstances that do not amount to 
impossibility. 12 However, in casc of frustration of contract - that means where the contract is 
rendcred useless by thc changc of circumstances - an exception is granted to this general rule. 13 In 
the United States, thc Uniforn1 Commercial Code has enacted the general doctrine of 
impracticability. 14 
9 See Philippe Malaurie and Laurent Aynes Droit Civil: Les obligations (3ed, Editions juridiques associi:es, 
Paris, 2007) 379-380, stating that the judge cannot alter the contract direct]y on his or her own unless the 
parties have agreed upon a clause de sazwegarde (hardship clause) or the law itself provides for the 
possibility of the judicial adjustrnent ofthe contract. However, the judge is entitled to apply the principle of 
good faith according to Articlc 1134(3) CC ifthere is a severe inequity and one party is acting in bad faith. 
See also Kessedjian, above n 6,425. 
10 Gennany: BGB§ 313 (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage); Netherlands: Dutch Civil Code (BW) Art 6:258; 
ltaly: CC, Art 1467 (eccessiva onerositO soprm,venuta); Greece: Greek Civil Code, Art 388; Portugal: 
Portuguese Civil Code, Art 437; Austria: Austrian BGB§§ 936, 1052, 1170a through analog),; Scandinavia: 
see Commission on European Contract Law Principles of European Contract Law (Kluwer International 
Law, the Hague, Nether]ands, 1999) Article 6:111, Commcnt note 1, 328 [Principles of European Contract 
Law}; sec also Ole Lando "CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles of 
Contract Law" (2005) 53 AmJ Comp L 379,397. 
11 See Hannes Unberath in Heinz Georg Bamberg er and Herbert Roth ( eds) Kommmentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch (2 ed, CH Beck, Munich, 2007) BGB § 313 paras 1-7. For the prerequisites conceming the 
adaptation to changed circumstances, see paras 25~84. 
12 In Common Law systems, "hardship" seems to be a mere tenn describing a fact and not a judicial concept. 
See Joseph M Perillo "Hardship and its Impact on Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Analysis" 
(Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, No 20, April 1996) 3; A H Puclinckx "Frustration, Hardship, Force 
Majeurc, Impr6vision, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Unmöglichkeit, Changed Circumstances" (1986) 
3 J lnt'l Arb 47, 64. 
13 See Guenter Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 314. The 
frustration of purpose doctrine amounts to the discharge of the contract: sec Ewan McKendrick "Discharge 
by Frustration'' in AG Guest (ed) Chitty on Contracts, Vol !: General Princip!es (30ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2008) paras 23-001-23-006. 
14 UCC § 2-615. The Restatement Second, Contracts 2d, reiterates this position: see American Law Institute 
Restatement on the Lm11 ofContracts (2ed, American Law Institute Publishers, St Paul, Minnesota, 1981) § 
261 
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III INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
Tue Principles on International Cornmercial Contracts (PICC 2004), 15 the Principles on 
European Contract Law (PECL 1999) 16 as weil as the Draft of a Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR 2008) 17 expressly provide for rules in case of a change of circumstances. In 2003, the 
International Chamber ofCommerce (ICC) published model clauses onforce majeure and hardship. 
Tue Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), howcver, does not contain a special 
provision dealing with questions of hardship. lt does not mention either force majeure or 
hardship. 18 Article 79 of thc CISG relicves a party from paying damages only if the breach of 
contract was due to an impedimcnt beyond its control. 19 The drafting history ofthis provision is not 
quitc clear. During the preparations of the CISG, the question of whether economic difficulties 
should give rise to an cxemption was a highly controversial one. 20 At the Vienna Conference, a 
proposal marle by the Norwegian delegation aimed at releasing the debtor from its obligation if, 
after the cessation of a temporary impediment, tl1ere bad been a radical change in the underlying 
circumstances was rejected.21 Thus, it is quite understandable that during the first years after the 
15 See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (UNIDROIT, Rome, 2004) Article 6.2.3 [Principles of International Commercia! Contracts] 
16 Principles of European Contract Law, above n 10, Article 6: 111. 
J 7 See Study Group on a Europcan Civil Code Draft Common Frame of Reference (Sellier, Muni eh, 2008) 
Artic\e IIJ - 1 :110 [Drqfl Common Frame of Reference]. 
18 See Ingeborg Schwenzer in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds) Kommentar wm 
einheitlichen UN Kaufrecht CISG (5 ed, CH Beck, Munich, 2008) Article 79 para 4; Denis Tallon in Cesare 
Bianca and Michael Bonei! (eds) Commentaiy on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Convention 
(Giuffre, Milan, 1987) Article 79 para 1.3, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale ofGoods (I 1 April 1980) NCONF. 97/18; 1489 UNTS 3, 59 [CISG]. 
19 See John Honnold Uniform Law for International Safes (3ed, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) 
Article 79 para423.4; Talion in Bianca and Bonei! (cds), above n 18, Article 79 para 2.6.2; Wilhelm-
Albrecht AchiJJes Kommen!ar zum UN-Kaufrechtsübereinlwmmen (CJSG) (Hermann Luchterhand, Berlin, 
2000) Article 79 para 3; Hanns-Christian Saiger in Wolfgang Witz, Hanns-Christian Saiger and Manuel 
Lorenz (eds) International Einheitliches Kaufrecht: Pralaiker-Kommentar wid Vertragsgestaltung zum 
CJSG (Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg, 2000) Article 79 para 4; Christoph Brunner Force Majewe and 
Hardship Under General Confract Principles: Exemption ofNon-Pe,fonnance in International Arbitration 
(Kluwcr Law Jnteruational, The Hague, 2009) 167. 
20 See John Honnold Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales: The studies, 
deliberations and decisions that led to the 1980 United Nations ConvenJion with introductions and 
explanations (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Netherlands, 1989) 602. See also Peter 
Schlechtriem Internationales UN-Kaufrecht (4ed, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007) para 288; Brunncr, abovc 
n 19,216; Talion in Bianca and Bonell (eds), above n 18, Article 79 para 2.6.7. 
21 The Norwegian delegation proposed that paragraph 3 of Article 65 of thc 1978 UNCITRAL Drafl 
Convention should be changed in the following way: "[ ... ] Nevertheless, the party who fails to perfonn is 
permanently exempted to the extent timt, aftcr the impcdiment is removed, the circumstances are so 
radically changed that it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable" ( emphasis added). See the 
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coming into force of the CISG some scholars argued that there was no room to consider hardship 
under Article 79_22 
Today, however, it is more or less unanimously accepted in court and arbitral decisions,23 as 
well as in scholarly writing,24 that Article 79 does indeed cover issues relating to hardship. 
Accordingly, first and foremost, there is no room to resort to domestic concepts ofhardship25 as 
there is no gap in the CISG regarding the debtor's invocation of economic impossibility and the 
adaptation of the contract to changed circumstances. If one were to hold otherwise, unification of 
the law of sales would be undermined in a very important area. Domestic concepts such as 
frustration ofpurpose, rebus sie stantibus, fundamental mistake or Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
would all have to be considered. 
However, which cases of hardship amount to an impediment under Article 79 and what 
remedies the aggrieved party may resort to are still matters of dispute. 
IV PREREQUISITES FOR FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER THE 
CISG 
A General 
Article 79(1) provides that a party is exempted from liability for damages only ifthe failure to 
perform is due, first, to an impediment beyond its control and, second, that it could not reasonably 
Nonvegian proposal (A/CONF.97/C.l/L.191/Rev.l) in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 10 March-11 April 1980 (Official Records, New York, 1981) 381. 
22 See Hans Stoll in Peter Schlechtriem (ed) Commenlary on the UN Convenlion on the International Safe of 
Goods (2ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) Article 79 para 39. 
23 However, the courts often decided tliat the equilibriwn of the contract was not fundamentally altered. 
Therefore, the alleged impediment was non-existent See Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and !ndustiy, 
12 Feb 1998, CJSG-online Case No 436; Rechtbank van Kooplumdel, Hasselt, 2 May 1995, CISG-online 
Case No 371; Tribunale Civile di Monza, 29 Mar 1993, CISG-online Case No 102; Cour d'Appel de 
Colmar, 12 Jun 2001, ClSG-online Case No 694. These decisions can be found by searching the case 
number on the CJSG-online website at www.globalsaJesJaw.org. 
24 See CISG AC Opinion No 7 Exemption of Liability for Damages Und er Article 79 of the CJSG (Rapporteur: 
Professor Alejandro Garro) 12 Oct 2007, Opinion 3.1 [CISG AC Opinion No 7]; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem 
and Schwenzer (eds), above n 18, Articlc 79 para 4; Niklas Lindström "Cbangcd Circumstances and 
Hardship in the International Sale of Goods" (2006) (Issue 1) Nordic Journal of Corrunercial Law 23-24; 
Brunner, above n 19,218; Schlechtriem, above n 20, para291. 
25 See Honnold, above n 19, Article 79 paras 425 and 432.2; Talion in Bianca and Bonell (eds), above n 18, 
Article 79 para 3.1.2.; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 18, Article 79 para 12; 
Joem Rimke "Force Majeure and Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific 
Regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts" in Pace 
International Law Review ( ed) Review of the Convention an Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) 1999-2000 (Kluwer, The Hague, 2001) 197,219. 
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bc expccted to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
or, third, to havc avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 26 Article 7.1.7(1) of the PlCC 2004, 
Articlc 8:808(1) of thc PECL 1999 as well as Article III -- 3:104(1) of the DCFR 2008 are 
practically identical to Article 79(1). The same holds true for the ICC's Force Majeure Clause. 
However, the latter gives a list of events that may amount to an impediment, such as war, natural 
disasters, explosions, strikes, acts of authority. Thus, conccming the issue offorce majeure, there 
are three clearly distinct prerequisites: the impediment must not fall in the sphcre of risk of the 
obligor; it must have been unforeseeable; and, it or its consequences must have been unavoidable.27 
As fär as the provisions regarding hardship are conccmed, again the international solutions bear 
great resemblance to one another. 28 In the first place, the relevant articles and clauses emphasise the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. 29 Tue mere fact that perfonnance has been rendered more onerous 
than could reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the contract does not 
exempt the obligor from perfonning the contract.30 Hardship can only be found ifthe performance 
of the contract has become excessively onerous 31 or, in other words, if the equilibrium of the 
26 See Hans Stoll and C'reorg Gruber in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds) Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Safe ofGoods (2 English ed, Oxford Univcrsity Press, Oxford, 2005) 
Article 79 puras 10-24; Peter Mankowski in Karsten Schmidt (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum 
Handelsgesetzbuch (CH Beck, Munich, 2004) Article 79 ClSG pura 17., Schlechtriem, above n 20, para 
289. 
27 See $toll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 paras 10-24; Talion in 
Bianca and Bonell (cds), above n 18, Article 79 para 2.6.; Honnold, above n 19, Article 79 para 423.4; 
Brunner, above n 19, 111-113. 
28 See Part III International Approaches. 
29 Princip!es of lnternafionnl Commercial Contracts, above n 15, Article 6.2.1; Principles of European 
Contract Lmv, above n 10, Article 6:111(1); Drafl Common Frame of Reference, above n 17, Article lll-
1 :110; ICC Hardship Clause 2003 para 1. See also Rimke, abovc n 25,237. 
30 See Schwenzer in Scl1lechtriem and Schwero::er (cds), above n 18, Article 79 para 14. See also Rimke, above 
n 25, 197,200; Schlechtriem, abovc n 20, para 291. 
31 Principles of European Contract Law, above n 10, Article 6:111(2); Draft Common Frame of Rejerence, 
above n 17, Article III - 1:110(2); ICC Hardship Clause 2003 para. 2(a). See also Peter Sch]echtriem 
Uniform Safes Law: The UN-Com,enfion on the International Sale of Goods (Manz, Vienna, 1986) 102; 
lTirich Magnus in J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetzen 
und Nebengesetzen, Wiener UN-Kauji-echt (CJSG) (15 ed, Sellier, Berlin, 2006) Article 79 para 4; Dietrich 
Maskow in Fri1:% Enderlein, Dietrich Maskow and Heinz Strohbach (eds) Jntemationales Kaufrecht (Haufe, 
Berlin, 1991) Article 79 para 6.3; Joseph Perillo "Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT 
Principles ofJnternational Commercial Contracts" (1996) 5 Tu! J lnt'l & Comp L 1, 9; Jennifer Bund "Force 
Majeure Clauses: Drafting Advice für the CISG Practicioner" (1998) 17 J L & Com 381, 389; 
Bernard Audit La vente internaJionale de marchandises, Convention des Nalions-Unies du 11 avril 1980 
(LGDJ, Paris, 1990) 174; Vincent Heuz6 La vente internationale de marchandises, Droit unifom1e (LGDJ, 
Paris, 2000) 425. 
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contract has been fundamentally altered. 32 Again, as in the force majeure provisions, the event in 
question must not fall in the sphere of risk of the aggrieved party; it must have been unforeseeable 
as well as unavoidable. Thus, hardship can be considered as a special group of cases under the 
generalforce majeure provisions. All that is added to theforce majeure provisions on the Jevel of 
prerequisites is a clarification ofthe term impediment in cases where performance in the strict sense 
is possible but just too onerous. This may justify dealing with hardship under the CISG as weil as 
under the other international harmonisation projects in a consolidated manner. 
B Relevant Thresholdfor Hardship 
Thc crucial point in the first place is to determine the threshold of hardship. When has 
performancc bccome cxcessively onerous? When has the equilibrium of the contract been 
fundamentally altered? Thereby, either an increase in cost of performance or a decrease in value of 
the perfonnancc rcccivcd may be relevant. 33 1bis means that the aggrieved party can. be either the 
seller or the buycr. 
The starting point has tobe the contract itself. Primarily, it is up to the parties to define their 
respective spheres ofrisk in the contract. 34 One party may have expressly or impliedly a-:sume_d 1.he 
risk for a fundamental change of circumstances or, on the contrary, certain risks may have been 
exprcssly or impliedly excluded. 35 This deterrnination can be done by simple contract 
interpretation. 
lf, for example, the contract is highly speculative, 1.he obligor can bc presumcd to havc a-:sumcd 
the risk involved in the transaction. 36 Thus, a Ge1man court of second instance37 did not cxcmpt a 
scller from liability under Article 79 of the CISG although the market price for thc contract item, 
iron molybdenum from China, had risen by 300 per cenL The court reasoned that in a trade sector 
with highly speculative traits the threshold for allowing hardship should be raised. As such, typical 
31 Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts, above n 15, Article 6.2.2. 
33 See Brunner, above n 19, 221-223. 
34 See Bulgmian Chamber of Commerce and Jndustryi_ 12 Feb 1998, CISG-online 436; Avery Katz "Remedies 
for Breach of Contract under tbe CISG" (2006) 25 Jnt'J Rcv L & Econ 378, 381. lt is also believed that the 
risk allocation is dependent on the parties' choice of law at the beginning: see Neil Gary Obcnnan Transfer 
of riskfrom seller fo buyer in international commercial contracts: A comparative analysis of risk allocation 
under the CISG, UCC and Incoterms (LLM Thesis, Universite de Montreal, 1997). 
35 See Brunner, above n 19, 147-148; Treitel, above n 13, 455; Katz, above n 34, 391; CISG AC Opinion 
No 7, above n 24, Comment para 39. 
36 Brunner, above n 19,220; JCC Award, 26 Aug 1989, No 6281, CISG-online 8; Rechtbankvan Koophandel. 
Tongeren, 25 Jan 2005, No 1960, CJSG-online 1106. 
37 See Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 Feb 1997, No 167, CISG-online 261. 
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fluctuations of price in the commodity trade generally will not give rise to an ackuowledgement of 
hardship. 3& 
It is questionable how the relevant thrcshold for giving rise to a hardship excuse is detcrmined if 
no such special circumstances exist. Whereas ihe Comment to Article 6.2.2 ofthe PICC 39 in its first 
edition of 1994 suggested that an alteration amounting to 50 per cent or more would likely amount 
to a "fundamental" alteration, the second edition of the PICC in 2004 refrains from recommending 
any exact figure. 
Certainly, in ascertaining whether any alteration amounts to hardsbip, primary consideration is 
to be given to the circumstances of the individual case. Thus, it may be relevant whether we are 
dealing with a short term sales contract or a long term instalment contract. 40 Ibe profit margin in 
the respective trade sector may also play an important role. Finally, in cases where the financial ruin 
of the obligor is imminent, the threshold for allowing hardship may be lowered. 41 
However, legal certainty clearly calls for some benchmark. Relying on a thorough comparative 
analysis of domestic solutions, one author42 has suggested that, as a general rule of thumb in 
standard situations, a threshold of 100 per cent should be favoµred. However, courts interpreting 
Article 79(1) CISG have been very reluctant to allow hardship in case of fluctuations of prices. 43 
Up to now, there is no single reported court or arbitral decision exempting a party - either a seller or 
a buyer - from liability under a CISG sales contract due to hardship. All decisions dealing with 
hardship under Article 79 concluded that even a price increase or decrease ofmore than 100 per cent 
would not suffice. 44 'Ibe suggested "100 per cent threshold" seems tobe based upon considerations 
of domestic markets where price fluctuations are not to be expected to the sarne degree as in 
38 Sec Benjamin Leisingcr Fundamental Breach Considering Non-Confonnity ofthe Goods (Sellier, Munich, 
2007) 119. 
39 Principles of ln!ernational Commercial Contracts, abovc n 15, comment 2. 
40 Brunner,aboven19,438-441. 
41 Ibid, 438-439. 
42 Jbid, 428-435; Christoph Brunner UN-Kaufrecht - C!SG, Kommentar zum Übereinlwmmen der Vereinten 
Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf von 1980, unter Berücksichtigung der 
Schnittstellen zum internen Schweizer Recht (Stämpfli, Bern, 2004) Article 79 CISG para 26. 
43 See ICC Award. 26 Aug 1989, No 6281, CISG-online 8; Tribunale di Monza, 14 Jan 1993, CISG-online 
540; Joseph Lookovsh.')' "Impediments and Hardship in International Sales: A Corrunentary on Catherine 
Kessedjian's 'Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship"' (2005) 25 Jnt'l Rev L & Econ 434, 
438 
44 lt is argued that an increased price is foreseeable for a company involved in international trade_ See 
C!ETAC, 10 May 1996, No 21, CISG-online 1067; Bulgarian Chamber ofCommerce and Jndustry, 12 Feb 
1998, No 11, CISG-online 436; Rechtbank van Koophandel, I!asselt, 23 Feb 1994, No 1849, CISG-online 
371; Cour d'Appel de Colmar, 12 Jun 2001, CISG-online 694; Cow· de Cassation, 30 Jun 2004, No 964, 
CISG-online 870. 
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international markets. In an international market, one may expect the potentially aggrieved party to 
insist on incorporating terrns for a possible adjustment in the contract or otherwise assuming the risk 
for higher fluctuations than usually occur on domestic markets. Thus, the margin certainly has to be 
set at a higher point. A 150-200 per cent margin seems tobe advisable. 
C Time Factor 
In cases offorce majew·e, it is more or Jess unanimously held that it is irrelevant whether the 
impediment arose after the conclusion of the contract or if it already existed at the time of 
conclusion. 45 Thus, if the goods sold had already been destroyed at the time of the conclusion of thc 
contract, but the seller did not know about nor could have prevented this fact, the seller may be 
exempted under Article 79(1) ofthe CISG.46 
In cases of hardship, however, it is argued that the changed circumstances must have occurred 
after the conclusion of the contract. 47 This is the position taken by domestic legal systems.48 
Similarly, the wording of Article 6:111(1) of the PECL 199949 is clearly based upon this 
assumption. The related Comment affnms this position. 50 However, although the wording of Article 
6.2.1 of the PICC 200451 seems to point in the same direction, Article 6.2.2(a) of the PICC 2004 
clarifies that hardship may be found if either the events that are causing the in1balancc of the 
45 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 12; RolfHerber and 
Beate Czerwenka Internationales Kaufrecht, Kommentar zu dem Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen 
vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkmif(CH Beck, Munich, 1991) Article 79 
parn 11; United Nations Secretariat "Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale ofGoods prepared by the Secretariat" (14 March 1979) A/CONF 97/5, OR 14, Article 65 
para 4; Karl H Neumayer and Catherine Ming in Francois Dessemontet (ed) Convention de Vienne sur les 
contrats de vente internationale de marchandises: commentaire (CEDIDAC, Lausanne, 1993) Article 79 
para 6; disapproving Talion in Bianca and Boncll (eds), above n 18, Article 79 note 2.4.3. 
46 See Stoll and Grubcr in Schlechtricm and Schwenzer ( eds ), above n 26, Article 79 para 12; ClSG AC 
Oplnion No 7, above n 24, Commcnt para 8. 
47 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 12; Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, above n 15, Article 6.2.2, Comrnent No 3a; Brunner, above n 19, 398-
399. 
48 See BGB § 313(1): "Haben sich die Umstände [ ... ] nach Vertragsschluss schwenviegend verändert . 
( emphasis added). 
49 See Principles of Ew·opean Contract Law, Article 6:111(1 ): __ if perfonnance has become morc onerous 
... " (emphasis added). See also Drafi Common Frame of Reference, above n 18, Article III- 1 :110(2). 
50 See Principles of European Contract Law, Article 6: 111, Cornment B (ii). 
51 See Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Article 6.2.1: "Where the perfonnance . becomes 
more onerous ... " (emphasis added). 
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performances occur or ifthey become knov.n to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion ofthe 
contract. 52 
To date, neither case law nor scholarly writing has discussed the relevant time factor under the 
CISG - assuming one accepts hardship as being covered by Article 79. In order to decide whether 
an initial gross imbalance between the performances of the parties, due to circumstances ncither 
knovm to the parties nor preventable, may amount to hardship under Articlc 79, one has to consider 
what other remcdics the aggrieved party could rely on when discovering that, already at the time of 
the conclusion ofthe contract, there had been a gross disparity bet\veen the respective values ofthe 
agreed upon performanccs. Most likely under domestic laws as weil as under PECL 1999, initial 
gross disparity between the parties' perforrnances will give rise to remedies for mistake. 53 These 
coexisting remedies may be tolerated within one single legal system; difficult problems, however, 
can arise when dealing with sales contracts undcr the CISG. 54 As the ClSG does not contain any 
provisions on mistake, this question would havc to be resolved relying on the otherwise applicable 
domestic law. 55 However, this may well lead to unpredictable results. For example, it might be 
questionable at what point in time production costs have riscn, be it before the conclusion of the 
contract or only afterwards. Furthennore, unifonnity in such an important area of sales law would 
be endangered by applying domestic ru]es an mistake to this question. lt is exactly these 
considerations that, in the case of force majeure, compel the same treatment for initial and 
subsequent impediments. Tims, ifthe goods have been destroyed at the time ofthe conclusion ofthe 
contract, domestic rules declaring such a contract as being void are cxcluded. 56 Nothing else, 
however, can apply in cases ofbardship. Thus, the very tenn ofhardship under the CISG should be 
interpreted and understood in the broadest sense, encompassing any change of circumstanccs after 
52 The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 seems 10 be open for interpretation. 
53 See Princip!es ofEuropean Contract Law, above n 10, Article 6:111, Comment B (ii). For the Netherlands 
see MM van Rossum "Validity" in Daniel Busch and others (eds) The Principles of European Contract 
Law and Dutch Law. A Commentary (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2002) 193; Restatement on the Law of 
Contracts, above n 14, § 266 ("Existing Impracticability or Frustration"). 
54 See Patrick C Leyens "CISG and Mi.stake, Uniform Law vs Domestic Law: The Interpretative Challenge of 
Mistake and the Validity Loophole" in Pace International Law Review (ed) Review ofthe Convention on 
Contractsfor the International Sale ofGoods (CJSG) 2002-2003 (Sellier, Munich, 2005) 3, 15. 
55 Jt is argued that a party can rely on mi.stake where the CISG and the domestic law provide the same 
remedies. For a detailed discussion about this matter see Leyens, above n 54, 34; Stefan Kröll "Selected 
Problems Conceming the CISG's Scope of Application" (2005) 25 J L & Com 39, 55. 
56 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlecbtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 12; Nicholas in 
Bianca and Bonell (eds), above n 18, Article 68 para 3.1; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 31, Article 4 para 
44 and Article 79 para 33; Kurt Siebr in Heinrich Honsell (ed) Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht (Springer, 
Berlin, 1997) Article 4 paras 5 and 15; Brunner, above n 42, Article 4 para 9; Maskow in Enderlein, 
Maskow and Strohbach (eds), above n 31, Article 79 para 5.2; but see Talion in Bianca and Bonei! (eds), 
abovc n 18, Article 79 para 2.4.3 
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tbe conclusion of the contract as well as a gross disparity of the value of performances alrcady 
existing at thc time of conclusion ofthe contract 
D Events that Could not Reasonably be Taken into Account or Avoided or Overcome 
.FOrce majeure as well as hardship can only exempt the aggrieved party from liability if the 
cvents causing the impediment could not reasonably be taken into account by the aggrieved party at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract 57 If they could have been taken into account by the 
aggrieved party, then it can be expected that this party would insist on incorporating a specific 
contract clause to deal with the prob lern. Thus, this party must be assumed to have taken the risk. 58 
Furthermore, even an impediment that the aggrieved party could not foresee at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract does not exempt it if overcoming the impediment is both possible and 
reasonable. 59 \Vhether the obligor can be expected to overcome the impediment has to be decidcd 
by taking thc above mentioned threshold for hardship into account. 60 Thus, for exan1ple, the scller 
must turn to another supplier or considcr alternative possibilities for the transportation ofthc goods 
if the increase in costs does not excced the relevant thrcshold. 
V CONSEQUENCES OF FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP 
A Exemption from Liabi/ity 
If thc non-performance is due to an impediment that fulfüs the conditions set forth in Article 
79(1) of the CISG or comparable provisions, 61 first and foremost, the obligor is relieved from its 
obligation to pay damages. 62 This includes so-called "liquidated damages" 63 as well as penalties (if 
57 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 22; Talion in Bianca 
and Bonell (eds), above n 18, Article 79 para 2.63; Saiger in Witz, Saiger and Lorenz (eds), above n 19, 
Article 79 para 5; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 31, Article 79 para 32 
58 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 22; Audit, above n 
31, 174; Talion in Bianca and Bonei] (eds), abovc n 18, Article 79 para 2.63.; Neumayer and Ming, above n 
45, Article 79 para 4. 
59 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 23; Honnold, abovc 
n 19, Article 79 para 432.1; Brunner, above n 19,322; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 31, Article 79 para 
34. 
60 See above IV Prerequisites for Force Mojeure and Hardship Und er the CISG. 
61 See Principles of International Commercial Contracts, above n 15, Article 7.1.1; Principles of European 
Contract Law, above n 10, Article 8:108; Draft Common Frame of Reference, above n 17, Article Ill -
3:104. 
62 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 43; Maskow in 
Enderlein, Maskow and Strohbach ( eds ), above n 31, note 4 to part IV: Befreiungen; Honnold, above n 19, 
Article 79 para 423.4; Brunner, above n 19,345,346 
63 See McKendrick "Discharge by Frustration" in AG Guest (ed) Chitty on Contracts, above n 13, para 26-
010; John D Calamari and Joseph M Perillo The Law ofContracts (5ed, Thomson West, St Paul, 2003) 611-
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they are at all valid under the governing domestic Jaw), unless the parties havc providcd othcrwise 
in their coniract. 64 
Article 8:101(2) of thc PECL 1999 clearly states that where a party's non-performance is 
excused, alongside v.rith the right to claitn damages, the right to performance is likewise excluded. 65 
\Vhether the exemption under Article 79 of the CISG also extends to the promisee's right of 
perfonnance has been a subject of considerable debate 66 becausc of the somewhat misleading 
wording of Article 79(5). 67 lt should be noted that, at the Vienna Conference, a Gcrman proposal 
that the wording should make it clear that if the impediment were a continuing one performance 
could not be insisted on was rejected. Jt was held that, in the case of actual impossibility, no 
problems would arise in practice whereas the categorical removal of the right to perfonnance could 
impair the promisee's accessory rights. 68 Although, especially among Gennan authors, there still 
remain doubts about the doctrinal justification, 69 nowadays it seems to be undisputed that, wherever 
the right to claiin performance would undermine the obligor's exemption, performance cannot be 
demandcd as long a<; the iinpediment exists. 70 This rule not only applies, for example, to cases of 
actual impossibility of performance, but also to cases ofhardship. 
615; Michael Bridge 7ne !nJemational Safe ofGoods, Law and Practice (2ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) para 10.44. 
64 See Stoll and Gruber in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 74 para 49; ICC Award, 
1992, No 7585, CISG-online 105. 
65 See also Dionysios Flambouras Comparative Remarks on CISG Article 79 & PECL Articles 6: 111, 8: 108 
(May 2002) www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp79.htm1 (last accessed 10 Jul 2008). 
66 See Stoll and Gruber in Sch]echtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 26, Article 79 para 43; Honnold, above 
n 19, Article 79 para495.2; Bund, above n 31,388; Brunner, above n 19, 345-346; Bridge, above n 63, para 
12.61; Heuze, above n 31,430. 
67 See CISG Article 79(5): "Nothing in this article prevcnts either party from exercising any righi other than to 
claim damages und er this Convention." 
68 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 10 March - 11 
April 1980, above n 21, 381-382; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 18, Article 79 
para 52; but see Brunner, above n 19, 362-363. 
69 See Magnus in Staudinger, above n 31, Article 79 para 58; Mankowski in Schmidt (ed), above n 26, Article 
79 para 8; Peter Huber in Kurt Rebmann and others ( eds) Münchener Kommenlar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch (5 ed, CH Beck, Munich, 2008) Article 79 para 29; Saiger in Witz, Salger and Lorenz (eds), 
above n 19, Articlc 79 para 12. 
70 See Schwenzer in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 18, Article 79 paras 53-54; Magnus in 
Stalldinger, above n 31, Article 79 paras 59-60; Achilles, above n 19, Article 79 para 14. See also Honnold, 
above n 19, Article 79 para 435.5. 
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B Right of Avoidance 
Among the rights that are not affected by an exemption is first and foremost the right to avoid 
the contract. 71 However, this right presupposes that the non-perfonnance amomrts to a fundamental 
breach of contract. \Vhether such a fundamental breach exists largely depends upon the 
circumstanccs of the individual case. 72 
Article 25 of the CISG - and likewise Article 7.3.1(2) of the PICC 2004, Article 8:103 of the 
PECL 1999 and Article Ill-3:502(2) ofthe DCFR 2008 - circumscribes a fundamental breach of 
contract as one that results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive it of what 
it is entitled to expect under the contract. One of the central questions thereby is whether i1 is 
possible and - having regard to the other party's CA.'})ectations - just and reasonable that the breach 
be remedicd. 73 Wc will rctum to this question below. 
C The Obligation to Renegotiate in Cases of Hardship 
In bona fide cases ofhardship, Article 6.2.3(1) ofthe PICC 2004, Article 6:111(2) ofthe PECL 
1999 as weil as Article Ill- l:110(3)(d) ofthe DCFR 2008 first state an obligation to renegotiate. 
Tue ICC's Hardship Clause 2003 likewise provides that the parties are bound to negotiate alternative 
contractual terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the changed circumstances within 
areasonable time ofthe invocation ofthe Clause.74 Ibis duty to renegotiate is seen tobe based on a 
general duty to act in good faith 75 which is common to many civil law systems. 76 
71 See CISG Arüclc 79(5); Stoll and Grubcr in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 27, Article 79 para 
4.; Brunner, above n 22, 366, 367; Honnold. above n 20, Article 79 para 435.1; AchiJJes, above n 20, Article 
79 para 14; Rimke, above n 26, 197,217; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 32, Article 79 para 55 
72 See Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), abovc n 27, Article 25 para 5: " ... any abstract 
definition l of the fundamental breach] must expect criticism ... ". See also Magnus in Staudinger, above 
n 32, Article 25 para 3; Brunner, above n 43, Article 25 para 8; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 12 Mar 2001, 
CISG-online 841; CJETAC, 30 Oct 1991, CISG-online 842. 
73 See CISG AC Opinion No_ 5 The buyer's right to avoid the contract in case ofnon-conforming goods or 
documents (Rapporteur: Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer) 7 May 2005, Opinion 3. 
74 See ICC Hardship Clause 2003 para (2)(b) 
75 See Brunner. above n 19, 480-481; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 31, Article 79 para 24; Brunner, above 
n 42, Article 79 para 24. 
76 The principle of good faith found its way into almost every Civil Law system through the reception of 
Roman law. See France: Article 1148 CC; ltaly: Article 1337 CC; Germany: § 242 BGB; Switzerland: 
Article 2 ZGB. Common Law systems, howevcr, tend 10 refrain from accepting good faith as a gcneral 
principle of contract law: see Michael Bridge "Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?" 
(1984) 9 Can Bus LJ 412, 426; Allan Farnsworth "Duties ofGood Faith and .Fair Dealing underthe Unidroit 
Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws" (1995) 3 Tu! J Int'l & Comp L 47, 51-
54. 
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Other legal systems do not know such a duty to renegotiate. This is not only true for common 
law systems, even where they recognise the general principle of hardship or impracticability as 
section 2-615 of the UCC does, 77 but also some civil law systems such as Germany where, under 
the newly enacted section 313 of tbe BGB, the parties are not bound to renegotiate either. 78 
Although there are some authors favouring such a duty to renegotiate under German law, 79 the 
prevailing view follows the clear wording of the provision that does not mention any such duty, but 
instead allows a party to immediately resort to the court asking for an adaptation of the contract. 80 
Likewise, neither thc ltalian nor the Dutch Code provisions on hardship81 obligc thc partics to 
renegotiate. 
Article 79(5) ofthe CISG, as has already been pointed out, expressly relieves the affected party 
from damages only. Some authors, however, advocate the idca that under the CISG as wcll therc is a 
duty to renegotiate based upon Article 7(1) ofthe CISG, according to which thc Convention has to 
be interpreted with regard to the obscrvance of good faith in international trade. 82 lt has becn 
qucstioned many times whcthcr Article 7(1) may be applied not only in interpreting the Convention 
as such, but also in cstablishing the principle of dealing in good faith among the parties. 83 Without 
77 § 2-615 (a) UCC states that "[d]elay in deliveI)' or non-deliveI)' . is not a breach of his duty under a 
contract for sale if perfonnance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency 
.... " For a detailed discussion of the impracticability doctrine in American law, see Treitel, above n 13, para 
6-001. 
78 See § 313 BGB which does not mention a duty to renegotiate the contract. 
79 See Christian Grüneberg in Otto Palandt and others (eds) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (67ed, Munich, 
2008) § 313 BGB, parn. 41; Helmut Heinrichs "Vetragsanpassung bei Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage: Eine 
Skizze der Anspruchslösung des§ 313 BGB" in Stephan Lorenz and others (eds) Festschrift für Andreas 
Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag (CH Beck, Munich, 2005) 183, 195; Karl Riesenhuber "Vertragsanpassung 
wegen Geschäftsgrundlagenstörung - Dogmatik, Gestaltung und Vergleich" (2004) 59 Betriebs-Berater 
2697, 2698. 
80 See Peter Schlechtriem "The Gennan Act to Modemize the Law of Obligations in the Context of Common 
Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe" [2002] Oxford U Comparative L Forum 2 
ouclf.iuscomp.org (last accessed 22 Jul 2008); Unberath in Bamberger and Roth (eds), above n 11, § 313 
para 85; Barbara Dauner-Lieb and Wolfgang Dötsch "Prozessuale Fragen rund um § 313 BGB" [2003] 
NJ\V921, 922. 
81 See Articles 1467-1469 Jtalian CC (onerositll); Articles 6:258 and 6:260 Dutch BW; Article 451 ofthe Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation. See also Klaus Berger "Renegotiation and Adaptation of futemational 
Investment Contracts: The Role of the Contract Drafters and Arbitrators" (2003) 36 Vand J Transnat'l L 
1347, 1356. For further references, see Brunner, above n 19,480. 
82 CISG AC Opinion No 7, above n 24, Comment para 40; /CC Award, Mar 1999, No 5953, Clunet 1990, 
1056. 
83 See Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 27, Article 7 para 7; Famsworth, above n 
76, 56. 
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having to decide this dispute the question of any duty to rcncgotiatc can be answered in the 
negative. 
In the first place, renegotiation - as negotiation - has to be based on willingness and trust. 
Constructive and cooperative renegotiation cannot be forced upon the parties by coercion. 84 
Furthennore, Jacking any means of specific enforcement, the duty to renegotiate amounts to nothing 
more than a farce. The duty to negotiate would gain importance only if breaching it were 
sanctioned. Indeed, this is envisaged by Article 6:111(3)(c) of the PECL 1999. Accordingly, the 
court may award damages for the lass suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off 
negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. Howevcr, it is certainly not advisable to state 
such a liability in damages. Cases ofhardship involve such complex fact situations and evaluations 
that it can hardly be determined whether a party refusing or breaking off negotiations acted in bad 
faith. In addition, international trade regularly calls for promptness and legal certainty, wbich 
militate against lengthy negotiations. Clear cases of bad faith may be taken into account upon 
allocating the costs of proceedings. 85 
To sum up, in cases of hardship a duty to renegotiate should not be advocated. This, however, 
does not preclude that an offer by one party to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances 
becomes relevant when dealing with the possible respective remedies ofthe parties. 
D Adaptation ofthe Contract andAvoidance 
Under some civil law legal systems, in cases of hardsbip, thc court is primarily called upon to 
adapt the contract to the changed circumstances. 86 A voidance is allowed only as a remcdy of last 
resort if an adaptation of the contractual terms is either not possible or not just and reasonable 
having regard to the respective interests ofthe parties. 87 Article 6.2.3(4) ofthe PICC 2004, Article 
6: 111(3) of the PECL 1999 as weil as Artic!e m - 1: ll 0(2)(b) of tlle DCFR 2008 also follow this 
approach. On the other hand, Article 1467 ofthe Italian Codice Civile as well as the ICC Hardship 
Clause 2003 take a different stand: the party invoking hardsbip is entitled to an avoidance of ihe 
contract; an adaptation of the contract is not contemplated. 88 
84 See Günter Roth in Wolfgang Krüger (ed) Münchener Kommentar zwn Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (5ed, CH 
Beck, Munich, 2007) § 313 BGB, para 93; Dauner-Lieb and Dötsch, above n 81,925. 
85 See Brunner, above n 19, 483. 
86 See§ 313(1) BGB. In Switzerland see Swiss Federal Supremc Court (Bundesgericht) on clausula rebus sie 
stantihus, BGE 107 II 343,348. 
87 See§ 313(3) BGB 
88 The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 states in para 3 that ".. the party invoking this Clause is entitled to 
tennination of the contract." 
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If one recognises hardship as an impediment under Article 79 of the CISG, it is questionable 
whether an adaptation of the contract is possible. 89 lt can hardly be conceived that there is a gap in 
the CISG that can be filled by giving the court or tribunal the power to adapt the contract to the 
changed circumstances. Therefore, it has been proposed to rely on Article 6.2.3( 4) of the PICC 2004 
as constituting an international usage in the sense of Article 9(2) of the CISG in order to reach the 
desirable result of adaptation. 90 lhis doctrinal method does not seem to be necessary, however. The 
usual remedy mechanism under the CISG in combination with the duty to mitigate as a general 
principle91 may yield satisfactory and flexible results in practicc. This may be demonstrated by the 
hypothetical case where the acquisition costs for the sellcr have tripled, thus giving rise to a plea of 
hardship. Upon the seller infonning the buyer that it is not able to perform the contract because of 
this event, there appear tobe two possible scenarios. 
Und er thc first scenario, thc scllcr suggests delivering thc goods if the buyer is willing to pay a 
highcr purchase price. If the buycr consents, the contract is accordingly adaptcd. If the buycr docs 
not conscnt, and the seller repudiates the contract, bac;ed on its original terms, on the ground of 
hardship, the buyer in turn will sue the seller for specific performance or, most probably, for 
damages. The court or tribunal will then find that the seller is released from its obligations due to 
hardship. Ifthe seller wmlts to go through with the contract, albeit on different teJUls, it will initiate 
a counter-claim seeking perfomrnnce or damages for v,.,rongful repudiation on the part of the buyer. 
The buyer will then rely on avoidance because of a fundamental breach. Now, the court or tribunal 
has to decide whether the fact that the seller was willing to deliver the goods, but on different teJUls, 
amounted to a fwidamental breach of contract giving the buyer the right to avoid the contract. Tue 
court here will have to consider whether it would have beenjust and reasonable for the buyer, in the 
circumstances of the given case, to accept the different tenns offered by the seller. If it finds that the 
buyer should have consented to an adaptation on the basis of good faith, it will find for the seller. 
Tuming to the second scenario, the buyer offers to pay a high.er price whereas the seller wants to 
get out of the contract. Under these circumstances again, probably the buyer will claim either 
specific perfonnance or dmnages. The court or tribunal now has to detennine whether, having 
regard to the different contract terms offered by the buyer, hardship can still be held to ex.ist. If not, 
the seller is not released from its obligation to perform or to pay damages. 
Thus, in both scenarios, results can be reached similar to those in legal systems that expressly 
provide for the power of the court or tribunal to adapt the contract to the changed conditions. 
89 But see CISG AC Opinion No 7, above n 24, Comrnent parn 40. 
90 See Schlechtriem, above n 19, para 291. 
91 Sec Ingeborg Schwcnzer and Simon Manncr "The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: Thc Impact of the Non-
Breaching Party's (Non) Behaviour on its CISG-Remedies" in Camilla Andersen and Ulrich Schroeter (eds) 
Sharing International Commercial Law Across National Boundaries - Festschrift for Albert H Kritzer 
(Wildy, Simmonds & Hili, London, 2008) 470, 480 
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Although there is no explicit duty to renegotiate under the CISG, there certainly is a duty to mitigate 
damages according to Article 77. This duty to mitigate may well require the aggrieved party to 
strike a deal even with the contract breaching party and, a fortiori, in cases where unforescen 
circumstances make performance excessively onerous for one party. 92 
Although this mechanism seems to be especially warranted in cases of hardship, it might also 
come into play in cases of other impediments under Article 79 ofthe CISG. Thus, where the seller 
has sold specific goods that were destroyed a:fter the formation of the contract, it may weil be the 
case that substitute goods exist, serving the buyer's interests just as weil aq the original ones. If the 
sellcr offers these goods as a "eure", the buycr may well be obliged to accept them as no 
fundan1cntal breach of contract can be ascertained in this case. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Whereas many systcms ~ especially, in recent times, PICC 2004, PECL 1999 and DCFR 2008 ~ 
clearly distinguish betwecnforce majewe and hardship under the CISG, both situations have tobe 
dealt with under the same provision, namely Article 79. And rightly so. All too often, drawing the 
line between force majeure and hardship is not possible. Tue days of the old Roman notion of 
"impossibility" are gone; most subsequent events do not render performance impossible and, thus, 
do not constitute a veritable impediment in tbe sense of Article 79; they just render performance 
more or Jess onerous for the obligor. Consequently, it seems preferable to deal with both situations 
under the same heading \Vith the same prerequisites and the same consequences. 
lt has bcen shown, undcr the remedics mcchanism of the CJSG, that there is enough flexibility 
to reach just and equitable resultc;, on thc one hand, that guarantee legal certainty and, on the other 
hand, that contribute to implementing good faith and fafr dealing in international sales law. Thus, 
the very minimalism ofthe CISG on questions ofhardship facilitates solutions that are well adjusted 
to the everyday needs of globalised international trade. 
92 Ibid, 470-486. 
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